[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.We want to consider these four determinations more closely.The τέλος determined formerly as δι᾽ αὑτó is what one quite generally designates as εὐδαιμονία,54 and this is generally translated as “happiness.” The consideration of the βίοι begins in Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Chapter 3: “It seems that what one understands by ἀγαθóν, by εὐδαιμονία, that which constitutes the genuineness of the being-there of human beings, has been taken οὐκ ἀλóγως from the βίοι (not in such a way that nothing is thereby exhibited, but rather in precisely such a way that something comes to appearance.”)55 Οὐκ ἀλóγως means, then, that this determination of the τέλος-being of the βίος is on the right path since, in fact, something substantial is exhibited.Aristotle says of the βίος ἀπολαυστικóς that it has its τέλος in ἡδονή, and in such a way that those who are resolved to it τυγχάνουσι δὲ λóγου,56 “come into conversation.” One speaks of them; one joins in; one equates what is common with what is right; and they have the approval of the crowd.Οἰ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν.57“By contrast, the educated and those who go into practical affairs, into a profession, posit the τέλος in τιμή.” They say that in concrete being-there as being-with-one-another, what one ultimately depends on is the “reputation” one has vis-à-vis others.On this point, Aristotle says that with the determination of the τέλος as τιμή, the ἀγαθóν is not with the one who is after reputation, but rather is with those who esteem the others; for they are the ones who have the ἀγαθóν at their disposal, while the others are after τιμή “in order to secure and convince themselves that their being-there is an ἀγαθóν.”58 Thus τιμή is not at all something in my own being-there as such; τιμή is not οἰκεῖον ἀγαθóν.I have τιμή by the grace of others.This is even more transparent in the case of ἡδονή, where Aristotle is not showing that this ἀγαθóν is brought to human beings from without; it is no δυσαφαίρετον, nothing “inevitable.” Even this higher τέλος as τιμή is not a τέλος that would be seen as an ultimate possession in being-there itself.But even the further determination as ἀρετή is κατὰ τούτους.59 “It is possible to be a competent fellow and yet sleep through one’s being-there, have bad luck, fail to succeed”60—two determinations: being-awake and succeeding.Thus further determinations are required if one is to flesh out ἀρετή, “competence.” The possibility that one sleep through one’s life or suffer bad luck requires that ἀρετή be ἐνέργεια, a matter that shows itself in deeds, that has its being in genuine, concrete being-there in every situation.“Turning-out-well,” εὐτυχία, is one determination among others of the genuineness of a concern.In εὐδαιμονία, εὐτυχία is also found.Why that is taken up by Aristotle, among others, can be understood only by keeping the Greek determination of being in view.The Greeks have the fully concrete sense of being-there as being-in-a-world, of being-there in its concretion, that being-there is to be seen in the vitality of the fulfillment of concern.What life has expressed concretely about itself is something that carries within itself its reasons.Aristotle says at the end of Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Chapter 2: καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διóτι,61 “when I am oriented to that [what life says about itself], no reference is needed to the διóτι—for this reason, because, since.” Life has spoken thus.Aristotle takes up the interpretation of the being-there of life in such a way that he takes it in a positive sense.On account of the fact that being-there, in how it speaks about itself, has addressed itself thus, it already carries its reasons.If I keep my attention fixed to the ὅτι, “that” life has spoken thus, and have understood it, then it requires no further διóτι.Life has appropriated its possibilities and made them explicit, and specifically in three respects—the three βίοι.Aristotle explicitly postpones the discussion of the βίος θεωρητικóς (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10).62 He explicates this βίος as the genuine possibility of human existence.The two other βίοι give him the opportunity to establish two types of τέλη: (1) ἡδονή, (2) τιμή.Ad 1.The consideration of ἡδονή is kept short since it is clear without qualification that such an ἀγαθóν steers being-there away from itself and turns it toward the world.In ἡδονή, being-there does not come to itself; life is lived by the world in which it moves, fully dependent on the world, not living its own being.Ad 2.The second candidate already has more going for it, insofar as it appears that in τιμή there is a distinctive possibility of being-with-one-another, of finding-oneself-among-others, insofar as I, particularly when I have a reputation vis-à-vis others, occupy a distinctive position in the world.Having a reputation vis-à-vis others is a distinctive disposition, which is, however, dependent on others.It is up to those with respect to whom I have a reputation whether to lend me a reputation or not.The others have the ἀγαθóν and give it to me as a present, but could just as well refuse it to me.It does not belong to my being as such [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]